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The World Summit on Sustainable Development,
which took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, in
September 2002, demonstrated that governments
worldwide are being challenged to find ways of recon-
ciling social equity with economic efficiency and sta-
bility, while ensuring resource sustainability, a “triple
bottom line”. Fisheries in developing countries, and
South Africa is no exception, are under strong and in-
creasing pressure (FAO 2000). Competition for re-
sources, globalization, pollution and increasing poverty
all contribute to chaotic and unmanaged resource use.
The situation in the first world is not much better (e.g.
Payne and Bannister 2003). As pointed out by Watson
and Pauly (2001), the omens are not particularly good,
with the world’s fish production being in decline for a
decade already. The sad truth is that sustainable man-
agement of fisheries has largely failed worldwide,
with many of the world’s great fisheries going from
abundance to depletion over the past 60 years (FAO
1997, Buckworth 1998, Charles 1998, Caddy 1999).
The South African government’s efforts to re-
structure the commercial fishing industry, following
the dismantling of Apartheid, presents an interesting
case study, which highlights the challenges and diffi-
culties in achieving the “triple bottom line”. The very
rapid change in the political system, from an authori-
tarian style of government under Apartheid to an open
democracy post-1994, placed huge demands on under-
resourced government departments with increasingly
outdated and inappropriate management systems. It
is therefore not surprising that the implementation of
legislation and policy aimed at correcting the imbal-
ances of the Apartheid era has been uneven, and in
certain instances, special administrative interventions
have been required to achieve policy goals. This paper
documents the fishing-rights allocation process fol-
lowing the introduction of the Marine Living Resources
Act of 1998 (Anon. 1998), the administrative problems
encountered, and the actions that were required to
ensure that it was fair, legal and transparent. It con-
cludes by evaluating the outcomes of the rights allo-
cation process in terms of the degree of “transforma-
tion” or racial equity achieved in selected commercial
fisheries, namely hake Merluccius capensis and M.
paradoxus, chokka squid Loligo vulgaris reynaudii and
West Coast rock lobster Jasus lalandi.
Addressing the Apartheid legacy in fisheries
Under the Apartheid administration, fishing rights
(allocated as a proportion of Total Allowable Catch
[TAC] or Total Allowable Effort [TAE]) were largely
denied to any person who was not classified “white”,
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and thus issues of racial equity had to be addressed as
a priority by the post-Apartheid government, by fish-
eries policy managers and by those in the industry
willing to embrace the new dispensation and reality
confronting them. At the same time, it was recog-
nized that the institution of fisheries management had
to be restructured to become more of a cooperative
governance arrangement appropriate to a modern de-
mocracy.  
Despite the difficulties experienced in implementing
the post-Apartheid fisheries “transformation” process,
South Africa is fortunate in several respects, because
few countries have been given a political mandate to
completely reinvent their fisheries management sys-
tems. South Africa’s most important commercial
fisheries are, broadly speaking, in fairly good shape
(Payne and Bannister 2003). Why this should be so is
open to debate. In the 1980s and 1990s good science
provided realistic input and output regulations – as in
Europe – but for South Africa the difference most likely
lies in the political dispensation of the time. A racist
dispensation limited the players in the fishing industry
to a select few, while the country’s geographical po-
sition and political isolation to some extent limited
access (legal and illegal) to South Africa’s resources.
The opening of fishing rights to many more players
in the post-Apartheid restructuring process has in-
evitably placed a strain on the fisheries administration,
and introduced new threats to resource sustainability.
Changes were first attempted following the first
democratic elections of 1994. To address the chal-
lenges facing South African fisheries, an exhaustive
series of consultations followed the appointment of a
Fisheries Policy Development Committee in 1995,
which in turn led to the publishing of the White Paper
on Marine Fisheries Policy in 1997 (Anon. 1997). With
the implementation of the Marine Living Resources
Act (MLRA) in 1998 (Anon. 1998), the fundamental
policy and regulatory framework for a new fisheries
management dispensation was put in place. The fisheries
policy development process has been reviewed during
its different stages (e.g. Cochrane and Payne 1998,
Hersoug and Holme 2000). 
The fishing industry, like all other sectors of the
South African economy, required a wide-ranging trans-
formation process in which the under-representation of
historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) and
historically disadvantaged companies (HDCs)1 con-
stituted the most important political challenge. Accor-
dingly, the Objectives and Principles of the MLRA
identify “the need to restructure the fishing industry
to address historical imbalances and to achieve equity
within all branches of the fishing industry”. There was
little formal published literature or detailed instruction
that could assist the fisheries managers in South Africa
with meeting this legislative requirement. More re-
cently, Martin et al. (2001) published a handbook enu-
merating approaches to some of the difficulties involved
in such a process. Most significantly, the Department
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (hereafter re-
ferred to as the Department) did not anticipate the legal
and administrative skills it required to effectively drive
this process of change, a process that would pro-
foundly affect existing and future investors in the in-
dustry and the socio-economic well-being of coastal
communities. 
Administrative problems
Given the momentous political changes in South
Africa, it is not surprising that initial moves to broaden
access to fisheries resources resulted in many new ap-
plications for fishing rights. In 1999, the Department
processed a total of 11 989 applications for the annual
allocation of rights. Prior to 1990, it had allocated no
more than 300 applications annually, so it was not sur-
prising that the administration of the Department was
plunged into a state of crisis management. A series
of problems ensued, including long delays in the al-
location of fishing rights, and repeated court chal-
lenges to the allocations made (by those denied access
to the resource and those who felt that too much had
been taken away from them). This resulted in loss of
confidence by the fishing industry, in the ability of
government to implement its new policy objectives,
or to bring stability back to the sector. The hake
longline fishery suffered more disruption than the other
sectors because the courts set aside the Department’s
decisions on several occasions.
The administrative crises brought about side effects,
most notably in fisheries compliance. Widespread
poaching and non-reporting of catches assumed new
and threatening dimensions, especially in the fisheries
for abalone Haliotis midae (Hauck and Sweijd 1999,
Hauck 2001), rock lobster (Groeneveld 2003) and hake,
as subsequent investigations, charges and litigation
revealed. 
With utmost urgency a new, clear, credible, enforce-
able and transparent management system, which took
into account transformation objectives and could with-
stand legal challenge, had to be established. In 2000, a
new team was appointed to re-start the process. In an
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1 Defined as “those persons or categories of persons, who prior to
the new democratic dispensation marked by the adoption and
coming into force of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act
No. 108 of 1996) were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on
the basis of their race and includes juristic persons or associations
owned and controlled by such persons”
effort to “buy time” to put in place arrangements that
would allow the new system to be developed, the
Department appealed to Parliament for a “breathing
period”. As a result, on 29 November 2000, the Pre-
sident signed an amendment to the Marine Living
Resources Act that gave the Department the legal
means to suspend the annual rights allocation process
during 2001 and to “roll over” all fishing rights held
in 2000. Although the effect of this was that the status
quo was extended for another year, it crucially provided
the time to organize and create a new management sys-
tem, culminating in the allocation of new fishing rights.
Towards a cooperative fisheries management system
As Caddy (1999) points out, the successful development
of a cooperative fisheries management system has to
take place amid wide consultation. Accordingly, in
2000 and 2001, more than 750 meetings with compa-
nies, communities and other interested parties were
held in an effort to re-build bridges between Govern-
ment and all those who had an interest in fishing. 
It is desirable that government should try to create
a positive environment for all rights-holders (estab-
lished and new) by assuring them of an ongoing right
to harvest, so that they have the incentive to consider
the long-term viability of the stock. Without such an
environment, co-management arrangements become
second to the conflict over rights (Hutton 2003). In
an earlier paper, Hutton and Pitcher (1998) refer to a
number of critical factors for successful participative
management, including the need to define the criteria
for participation in the fishery and its management,
and the establishment of rules for the allocation of
costs and benefits between the participants. Such
considerations were embodied in two policy documents
that were released for public comment. Grievances
about the existing system were noted and analysed,
and proposals for improvement were invited and con-
sidered. Industry associations contributed by submitting
proposals or “rule books” for each fishery, based on their
perspective.
From this process emerged the basis for the first
comprehensive manual on how to manage the South
African fishing industry. It was obvious that this would
be a long and arduous task, and, as noted by Hutton and
Pitcher (1998), it would be naïve to expect such an
undertaking to result in a quick-fix solution. The
completion and adoption of the fisheries management
manual was halted as a result of time and legal con-
straints, because the team had to concentrate on setting
up the legal and administrative framework for the
new rights-allocation system. The lack, previously,
of clearly defined fishery management policies and
objectives limited the options available to the rights-
allocation team who had to be guided by the broad
objectives of the MLRA, the legal rights of existing
fishing rights-holders, and the limited information
available on the biology, economics and history of
each fishery.
A NEW SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING FISHING
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
At the outset it was clear that a new allocation system
would have to take a number of key considerations into
account, including: 
• A simple, but practical plan that would be in place
before the start of the next fishing season;
• Communicating the main features of the plan, with
the purpose of winning the support of the fishing
industry, political decision-makers and the general
public, and rebuilding confidence within the De-
partment; 
• Ensuring that economic and social considerations
would not be compromised. Given the social in-
equalities created under Apartheid, this would be a
major challenge; 
• Acceptance that the majority of fishing sectors
were oversubscribed and that many applicants from
both historically advantaged and disadvantaged back-
grounds would be unsuccessful;  
• Recognition that there could be no technical solution
to the allocation dilemma. Although a scoring system
would form part of the assessment of applications,
judgement had to play a part when balancing appli-
cations against one another; 
• Recognition that, besides the objective of transfor-
mation, the creation of small and medium-sized en-
terprises was a policy requirement. 
More generally, it was imperative to understand
fully the achievements and impact of the previous al-
locations. Initial efforts at transforming the South
African fishing industry had started in the early 1990s,
when a number of new entrants, mostly small or
medium-sized companies owned or partially owned
by HDIs, were allocated fishing rights. To accommo-
date the new entrants, large quota-holders had their
allocations reduced. In some instances, it was later
discovered that fishing rights were allocated to sham
entities, and when the complex shareholding and
convoluted company structures were analysed, white
companies and individuals turned out to be the actual
owners and managers of some of these new compa-
nies. This system of “fronting” contributed to the dis-
crediting of early allocations of fishing rights. Further,
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fishing rights were often held by so-called “paper” or
“cardboard” quota-holders. These descriptions refer
to the practice of holders of fishing rights leasing or
transferring their fishing rights by private treaty to
others (mostly white, established companies), often
for substantial financial benefit, rather than investment
in infrastructure and involvement in fishing them-
selves. Given the fact that the quantity of fish allocated
was often small, it could be argued that new entrants
had little option but to lease their fishing rights back
to the established companies.
Whereas this rent-seeking behaviour was logical
(small, annual allocations did not warrant the risk to
invest, nor would banks extend loans), it did little to
advance the Department’s objectives of supporting
black-owned companies. Uncertainty, caused by having
to re-apply annually, together with an undefined trans-
formation policy, led to a lack of investment in the
fishing sector, and both fleet and fishing gear were
becoming obsolete in many fisheries2. At the same
time, the demands from those not allocated rights in-
creased. Demonstrations, sit-ins and hostage-taking of
officials at the Department’s offices took place on a
regular basis. The inability to respond effectively to
these incidents highlighted the lack of resources, skills
and resolve within the Department at the time. The
need for certainty and industrial stability, for historical
participants and potential new entrants alike, became
paramount. 
Apart from ensuring that policy considerations
would be properly taken into account, the Department
also had to invest in administrative infra-structure
that would:
• be able to deal with large numbers of applications;
• be able to scrutinize each application; 
• be transparent and meet the requirement of providing
access to information, including the ability to pro-
vide records of all decisions in regard to each fishing
sector and beyond that for each applicant;
• be seen to be equitable and fair; 
• be able to verify the information submitted by appli-
cants; 
• stand up to legal scrutiny; 
• establish a database that would reflect the details and
assessments of each applicant and thus establish a
benchmark for future allocations. 
Because the Department was under-resourced to
undertake this complex task and qualified personnel
were in short supply, it was through the contracting of
legal and administrative staff that a modest but viable
structure was created to administer the 2001 rights
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2 The economic and sectoral study of the South African fishing in-
dustry found that, in 2000, the average age of a vessel in the
fishing fleet was 22 years
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Fig. 1:  A schematic representation of the key elements of the new allocation system
allocation process. Scientific and other staff that had
previously been co-opted into the adjudication of the
annual rights allocations were now largely freed of
this responsibility. The new system ensured that scien-
tists were relied upon only to give advice on the state
of resources and related management issues. They
were not required to take administrative and legal re-
sponsibility for the allocation themselves, something
for which they had no training and that they had under-
taken reluctantly in the past. It is important to note that
a key requirement throughout the allocation of the 22
commercial fisheries was that the decision-makers did
not tamper with or manipulate the scientific advice pro-
vided in the form of TACs and TAEs.
The new system began to take shape. Its general fea-
tures are shown in Figure 1 and are expanded on below.
Medium-term rights
Since the inception of the MLRA in 1998, an annual
allocation of fishing rights had been used by Govern-
ment to facilitate the transformation process. However,
by 2000 this practice had the effect of destabilizing
the South African fishing industry. One-year rights
did not provide adequate surety for banks in relation
to the size of the loans required for the acquisition or
re-investment of assets required by the fishing industry.
In market terms, the lack of stability threatened the in-
ternational competitiveness of the industry. The notion
of medium-term fishing rights, which would be valid
for a four-year period, constituted a manageable politi-
cal compromise between government’s means to ef-
fect further transformation and the need for a measure
of security for investors in the industry. At the close of
the four-year period, government would have one fur-
ther opportunity to enhance transformation through
the allocation process, at which point Government
could allocate long-term rights. The MLRA allows for
fishing rights to be granted for a period of up to 15
years.
Application fee and form
The next in a number of steps was to increase the appli-
cation fee. Previously, an application fee of only R100
(equivalent to US$15 in 1999) had been charged, ir-
respective of whether or not the right allocated would
translate into a multi-million Rand business. In fact,
the nominal application fee was part of the reason
why the Department was inundated with applications;
in certain instances, people applied up to 15 times for
the same rights, each time under a different name.
Many viewed the allocations as a form of lottery, and
applied with the sole intention of selling their rights. In
the end, a broad, catch-all figure of R6 000 was deter-
mined as the new application fee for full commercial
fishing rights. The application fee for limited, or small-
scale, commercial fishing rights was set at R500.
The application form that was used until 2001 had
captured insufficient detail from applicants. As a re-
sult, it failed to assist the decision-maker in testing
the merits of an applicant, nor did it allow for “com-
parative balancing” between applicants, a key feature of
the new system. Clearly, a comprehensive set of ques-
tions had to be devised in order to solicit sufficient
information and to provide a basis on which applications
could be scored and ranked. The obvious pitfall of
such an approach is that the application form becomes
complicated and therefore difficult for less sophisti-
cated fishers to respond to. Clearly, a challenge for
the future will be to design an application form that
is better able to balance the decision-maker’s need for
information with the applicant’s need for simplicity.
This is particularly true for those fishers who apply
for “limited” commercial fishing rights, because
many live in remote coastal towns and are unschooled
in the complexities of bureaucracy and administration. 
Ability to verify
The role of the Rights Verification Unit (RVU; Fig. 1),
consisting of contracted outside expertise, was to check
on applicants who may have misrepresented themselves
or attempted to deceive the Department. State-of-the-art
computer software was used to scan information from
each application, which was then submitted to the
decision-makers and their advisers in simplified and
tabulated format. This strategy met with limited success
only, because the majority of applicants did not re-
spect the “letter per allocated box” spacing that is re-
quired for such a process to succeed. Low levels of
literacy and the filling in of forms in both English
and Afrikaans by many applicants were also a stum-
bling block. However, applications could not be re-
jected simply because of the way in which the forms
were completed. To remedy this situation, data cap-
turers were hired to transmit the information onto a
database. Of course, capturing data in such a manner
itself required checks for accuracy of the data captured.
The verification process led to the exposure of several
fraudulent applications, which were rejected. Where
such information only came to light after fishing rights
were allocated, the relevant powers under the MLRA
(Section 28) were invoked and rights were withdrawn.
Ongoing verification is seen as vital to the overall pro-
cess, which will continue throughout the duration of
the rights.
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Advisory Committee
Once the initial verification process had been com-
pleted and the information summarized, an Advisory
Committee, which, like the RVU, was made up of in-
sourced personnel, most notably legal and adminis-
trative staff, assessed each application. The Advisory
Committee was independent of the Department and
was required to retain a neutral stance. Originals of
each application remained under lock and key at the
offices of the RVU to meet any accusations that ap-
plications had been tampered with. The task of the
Advisory Committee was to assess and summarize
each application according to set criteria, as deter-
mined by the Department’s policy. Furthermore,
members of the committee were required to score
each application and then to present this information,
in summary form, to the Minister’s delegate for adju-
dication. Applicants were scored and then ranked
against one another in accordance with criteria based
on, inter alia, degree of transformation, degree of in-
volvement and investment in the fishery, capacity to
harvest and market the resource, past performance in
the fishery, legislative compliance (e.g. tax compliance)
and degree of paper quota risk (i.e. whether the ap-
plicant was likely to sell his or her rights without in-
vesting in the fishery). 
One of the fundamental decisions that was made
during the scoring process was to stream applications
into “existing rights-holders” and “new entrants”. This
method was devised to ensure equity between these
essentially different applicants. The adjudicator then
determined how many “previous rights-holders” should
be allocated rights and how many “new entrants”
should be admitted. 
The scoring system was designed in such a way
that it would advantage previous rights-holders who
had achieved a high degree of transformation in their
ownership or management, and new entrants who, by
definition, were “transformed” in their composition,
and could also demonstrate involvement and prefer-
ably investment in the industry. New entrants were not
required to own a vessel. However, they had to demon-
strate that they had access to a suitable vessel through
a binding catch agreement with a vessel owner.
Communication
A fundamental aspect of the process was to commu-
nicate with the applicants and the wider public. This
was achieved through regular news bulletins. Other
means of communication, such as e-mail, through indus-
try associations and fishing harbour offices, were used.
A comprehensive written summary of the decision-
making process was made available to applicants, a step
that contributed to the transparency of the process. The
summary included the general reasons why an appli-
cant succeeded or failed. All applicants received indi-
vidual notification that advised them of the outcome,
in what respects their application had failed and how
they should lodge an appeal. 
The Department instituted a “tip-offs anonymous”
call centre to enable the public to report irregularities
that they perceived were committed either by depart-
mental officials or by fishers or fishing companies.
The service is run independently of the Department
and is currently used by the public. All accusations are
investigated and, where required, acted upon. 
OUTCOME OF THE ALLOCATIONS
In total, 5 496 applications for commercial rights were
received for the four-year period (2002–2005), a re-
duction of approximately one-half of the total for 1999.
By February 2002, 1 879 medium-term fishing rights
had been allocated in the most important commercial
fisheries. In marked contrast to previous years, these
allocations were largely completed on time, and fishing
operations could generally commence at the begin-
ning of the fishing season. 
The internal appeal process began immediately. Of
the 3 574 potential appellants, 1 501 lodged internal
appeals. Under current legislation, the Minister has
to attend to these personally. He upheld 283 appeals,
bringing the total number of rights-holders to 2 162. 
After the internal appeal process, aggrieved appli-
cants have the possibility and right to seek relief through
the courts. However, some applicants ignored the in-
ternal process and sought relief immediately after the
allocations. In the longline sector, all fishing had pre-
viously been stopped when the courts were asked to
grant urgent interdicts against the Department, re-
questing the Minister or his delegate to make a new
allocation. On this occasion, similar urgent applications
were made once again, but the applicants failed to
persuade the courts of the urgency of the request and
the judge found in favour of the Department.
The most substantive challenge to the process it-
self came from two companies in the hake trawl sector.
The aggrieved companies requested the court to order
the Department to re-allocate the rights in the trawl
sector. They argued that, as wholly HDI-owned com-
panies, they were entitled to a bigger share of the
TAC. Although the High Court in Cape Town had ini-
tially found in favour of the applicants, the judgement
was later overturned by the South African Supreme
Court of Appeal. A unanimous ruling by a bench of
30 African Journal of Marine Science 25 2003
five Appeal Court judges set aside the previous ruling
(a full account of this case is available on www.environ-
ment.gov.za.).
In setting TACs or TAEs, there is an inherent tension
between ensuring sustainability on the one hand and
demands for access by the Industry on the other. This
has been the underlying cause for litigation against
the Department. It is believed that this landmark
judgement may finally bring to an end the litigious
environment that characterized the South African
fishing industry for the past decade.
SELECTED CASE STUDIES
Without doubt, transformation has been the major
policy driver in the South African fishing industry
over recent years. Its impact and consequence for the
industry needs to be measured and studied beyond
the figures provided in this paper. Besides transfor-
mation, there has been a “de-concentration” in the
form of taking the TAC or TAE away from large com-
panies and allocating it to a larger number of small
and medium-sized companies. This is evident from the
fact that, prior to 1994, rights were held by fewer than
500 companies compared with the more than 2 000
rights now allocated.
For purposes of illustration, a brief description is
provided below of how the new allocation system
performed for three sectors of the fishing industry:
hake, squid and West Coast rock lobster. The examples
demonstrate the complexities that arise when trans-
formation, resource sustainability and industry stability
are addressed in the context of individual companies,
specific fishing sectors and the industry as a whole. 
Three indices were used to measure transformation:
(1) ownership, as a percentage of rights-holders in
each fishery that are majority (>50%) HDI-owned;
(2) employment equity, as an indication of the percent-
age of rights-holders that are majority HDI-managed;
and (3) the amount of TAC or TAE that is allocated to
majority HDI-owned companies. The terms “majority
owned” and “majority managed” are used to indicate
that transformation is not a policy that simply takes
from one group and gives to another. In most compa-
nies there is, in ownership, in management, and indeed
in staff complement, a mix of HDIs and those desig-
nated white. 
Hake
The hake resource is widely distributed along the
South African coastline. Its trawl fishery is more
than a century old (Payne 1995) and was historically
concentrated in the hands of a few companies (Lees
1969). The hake fishery is economically the most
prominent sector, currently worth some R1.45 bil-
lion, with foreign exchange earnings of the order of
R750 million annually. It is the largest South African
exporter of perishable frozen products and has an inter-
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Fig. 2: Number of quota-holding companies and trend in the proportion of the TAC controlled by founding 
companies in the deep-sea hake trawl sector, 1978–2001 (R. Bross, South African Deepsea Trawling
Association, and T. Hecht, Rhodes University, unpublished data)
national reputation for quality and reliability. Largely
because of the vertically integrated nature of the two
largest companies, the South African trawling industry
has a high ratio of seagoing to onshore employment.
The number of participants in the hake deep-sea
sector increased steadily over the past decade (Fig. 2).
In 1978, three participants shared the TAC, compared
with 57 participants prior to 2001. Over that period,
the proportional holdings of the founding companies
decreased to below 60% of the TAC. After the 2001
allocation, 74% of rights-holders in the fishery are
majority HDI-owned (Fig. 3) and 53% of the companies
have more than half of their management comprising
HDIs. In allocating medium-term rights, the Department
decided not to allow further new entrants into the deep-
sea fishery, because further “de-concentration” of the
sector was not considered to be economically justifiable.
The fact that the majority of the 138 127 ton TAC for
trawl hake is allocated to two large, so-called “pio-
neer”, companies needs to be viewed in the context
that these companies have in turn acquired appreciable
HDI shareholdings. Also, cognisance had to be given
to the need for stability by providing large-scale, on-
shore permanent jobs. The large companies produce
mainly branded, packaged goods and employ about
66 people per thousand tons of fish landed, whereas
the small companies produce less sophisticated products
and consequently employ relatively fewer people.
Redistribution of the TAC to small companies would
not necessarily have compensated for jobs lost to pio-
neer companies when quotes were relocated. 
In the hake longline fishery, the view was taken that
this sector was better suited for medium-sized enter-
prises, in which higher levels of HDI participation
could be accommodated. Compared with the hake
trawl sector, investment levels are lower and therefore
participation by new entrants more easily achieved.
As a result, 90% of the TAC was allocated to companies
that are majority HDI-owned.  
Squid
The squid industry is relatively new (<20 years old).
The fishery is mainly restricted to the south-east coast
of South Africa (Augustyn et al. 1992, Sauer et al.
1992, Augustyn and Smale 1995; Fig. 4a). Investment
levels are less than for the hake trawl sector, because
vessel costs are lower and there is little processing
involved. The sector has attracted medium and family-
type businesses. Within this context, the target for
transformation is not easily achieved, especially when
vessels are heavily bonded by their owners. The re-
source also has a history of fluctuating abundance
(Augustyn and Smale 1995), which has created eco-
nomic uncertainty in the industry over the years. Such
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Fig. 3: (a) Deep-sea trawling grounds for hake, and (b) owner-
ship, (c) employment equity and (d) TAC distribution of
the fishery
adverse factors are the likely reason why relatively
few new entrants have applied for access to this fishery.
The result is a less favourable index of transformation
(Fig. 4). Given that the fishery operates in an eco-
nomically depressed area of South Africa, this outcome
is controversial and has attracted negative comment.
West Coast rock lobster
This fishery poses its own unique and complex issues.
Heavy fishing mortality and a natural phenomenon
of reduced somatic growth have caused the resource
to decline over the past few decades (Pollock et al.
2000). Owing to a complex life history pattern (Pollock
1995), it is found along a long coastline (Fig. 5a), and
the fact that its geographical abundance varies neces-
sitates zonal or area allocations. 
Rock lobster is a high-value species, which is in-
creasingly harvested for the export market. Because
lobsters are easily accessible from the shore, the
Department created a category of limited or small-
scale commercial rights-holders, with allocations of
between 200 and 1 500 kg each. Such small amounts
clearly indicate the difficult compromises fisheries
managers had to make when balancing viability, re-
source control and social and political expectations.
In all, 512 small-scale and 234 full commercial rights
were allocated for this sector, the latter being awarded
between 1.45 and 95.65 tons each. In the allocation
process, a number of companies that previously held
fishing rights had their allocations removed to pro-
vide space for 32 new entrants. The introduction of
limited rights allocations, as well as the degree to
which existing companies had transformed, together
with the accommodation of new entrants, resulted in
an overall transformation profile that was higher than
in most other fishing sectors (Fig. 5).  
THE WAY FORWARD
Ultimately, a high degree of transformation has been
achieved in the fishing industry, compared with other
industrial sectors of South Africa. The degree of trans-
formation will most likely change during the four-
year period of medium-term rights. Some HDI share-
holders may disinvest or invest according to what
market forces dictate. Given the overall policy thrust
in South Africa, companies that still have a “white”
image will independently seek new and further HDI
shareholders. For the foreseeable future, the interaction
between market forces and the policy objective of
transformation will dominate the fishing industry, as
it has for other industrial sectors in South Africa. In
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Fig 4: (a) Squid fishing grounds, and (b) ownership, (c) em-
ployment equity and (d) TAC distribution of the fishery
addition, some small and medium-size operations that
currently have access to the resource may not be ca-
pable or viable as business entities and therefore may
wish to sell out to larger entities. Current policy pre-
vents such amalgamations from taking place. The
lack of capacity within user groups is a key challenge
to the success of the new system, both in their ability
to run a successful business and to play a meaningful
role in collaborative management (Hutton and Pitcher
1998). Because the Department is not equipped to
train such entities, the South African Department of
Trade and Industry and private sector organizations
have been approached to provide training for small
companies.
Fisheries administration is often bedevilled by lack
of basic information, and the allocation process pre-
sented here experienced such problems. Fundamental
to the successful outcome of future allocations is having
established a benchmark against which to measure a
range of issues that were recorded during the allocation.
For this to be of real benefit, the comprehensive data-
base established during the allocation process needs
to be refined and continuously updated with such in-
formation as catch returns, vessel changes, changes
to permit conditions, levy payments, changes to the
transformation status, compliance transgressions,
employment data and economic data of various kinds.
It is also important to take cognisance of the draw-
backs of the present system. A comprehensive “lessons
learnt” workshop held in November 2002 provided a
route map for the next round of fishing rights alloca-
tions. It notably pointed to the skills needed, the ad-
ministrative systems required to be built and main-
tained, and the capacity that should be in-sourced
when the next rights are allocated. Key to the latter is
the buying-in selectively of legal and other capacity,
required only during the periods when rights are to be
allocated.
Steps have been taken for South Africa to move
towards a more cooperative-based management system
(e.g. Hilborn 1992, Hutton and Pitcher 1998, Hutton
2003), in which Management Working Groups are
set up for each sector of the fishing industry, comprising
both industry and government representatives, and
where joint decision-making can take place. In this pro-
cess, it is important that government clearly demon-
strates its future policy in regards to transformation
of the industry. The process should be informed of
the targets government intends setting, of the time-
frames for transformation, and whether such targets
are to be enforced by law or through the industry’s own
actions. There are related questions that also require
clarity and deliberation. How many rights should be
allocated per sector? When and under what conditions
will rights be transferable? Do specific sectors need
to be further “de-concentrated” or should consolidation
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Fig 5: (a) West Coast rock lobster fishing grounds, and (b) own-
ership, (c) employment equity and (d) TAC distribution of
the fishery
through normal market forces take its course? How
long will the next rights be? Answers to these questions
relate directly to the economic efficiency of the sector
and therefore to the South African economy.
The challenges ahead remain many and pose a
daunting task for all involved in South Africa’s fish-
eries management. The process thus far constitutes a
step in the overall objectives and should not be seen
as an “ultimate product”. It is too early to tell whether
South Africa has successfully integrated its new political
reality with a management regime that ensures the
sustainable utilization of its fisheries. 
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